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The model describes a two person economy, in which one individual with
positive exogenous income is altruist towards an individual with no income.
The rich individual cares for her own social status. She evaluates her status
by comparing disposable net cash incomes. When deciding on the size and on
the structure of redistribution, the rich person decides that at least part of
the redistribution is done in–kind, even if a private substitute for the publicly
provided good is available. The amount of in–kind transfers that is provided
exceeds the unconstrained Marshallian demand of the poor individual for the
good in question. Hence, optimal policy restricts the poor in his allocative
choices. The overall resource transfer is lower when the richer cares for her
status compared to a situation in which she does not.
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11 INTRODUCTION 2
1 Introduction
One of the essential conclusions from the ﬁrst and second theorem of welfare eco-
nomics is that redistribution can be done eﬃciently by using lump–sum cash trans-
fers. However, real world observations tell us that in many developed countries a
considerable share of redistribution is given in–kind by the public provision of pri-
vate goods. Health care systems and public education are surely the most prominent
examples.1
This paper gives a new explanation why in–kind transfers are often chosen to
redistribute resources from wealthier to poorer individuals, even if eﬃcient cash
transfers are a feasible alternative. My argument is motivated by some observations
made during recent public sector reforms in European countries: On one hand there
was widespread support for redistribution, even by people who were not immedi-
ately concerned by the intended cutbacks. On the other hand discussions in the
media were inﬂuenced by some new sociological phenomenon: In times of sensible
economic pressure – caused among other developments by increasing international
competition, high unemployment and growing economic uncertainty – people of the
middle class seem to be increasingly haunted by the fear of their own potential so-
cial decline.2 This phenomenon may also be interpreted as the fear of a shrinking
distance between one’s own (not at least ﬁnancial) situation and the situation of
beneﬁciaries of transfer incomes.
I argue that the support for redistribution as such, which I explain by assuming
that people are altruistic towards the poor, and the concern for one’s own income
position and social status jointly explain why at least part of redistribution is given
in kind, and why people may ﬁnd a transfer system consisting only of cash transfers
unattractive. I consider an economy with two people, one with some positive exoge-
nous income and one without any income, and a government executing the preferred
policy of the richer individual. In the following, the individual with positive exoge-
nous income is called ”the rich”, and the individual with no exogenous income is
called ”the poor”. These terms are chosen only to simplify the language. The term
”rich” does not imply that the income diﬀerential between the two is necessarily
very big and that the rich is very wealthy. Anecdotic evidence suggests that, if that
were the case, those really wealthy people might perhaps not be concerned about
the income gap between themselves and the poor as this gap would be too large. On
the contrary, their attitude towards the poor is likely to be driven by other motives,
1Besley and Coate (1991) show that redistribution by in–kind transfers is feasible, but underline
that there are more eﬃcient ways to transfer resources from rich to poor people.
2In Germany, the press even found a name for this phenomenon: They dubbed it Abstiegsangst.1 INTRODUCTION 3
which are not captured by this model.
Here, the rich is altruist, but also compares her own disposable cash income to
the poor’s cash income in order to evaluate his status in society. Hence, she wants
the poor to be better oﬀ and favors redistribution, but not at the price of making
him ’too rich’ compared to herself. The chosen policy mix of cash and in–kind
transfers distorts the poor’s optimal allocation of his ﬁnancial resources by forcing
him to overconsume the publicly provided good. Compared to a situation where
people completely ignore status concerns, total redistribution may decrease.
This argument diﬀers fundamentally from the well known explanations: These
saw paternalist preferences of the donor (Pollack (1988)), the will to avoid strategic
action by the donee (Buchanan (1975), Coate (1995), Bruce and Waldman (1991)), a
desire to achieve equality of opportunity (Gasparini and Pinto (2006)), the potential
stimulating eﬀect of in–kind redistribution on labor supply (Gahvari (1994)), or the
property of in–kind transfers to allow for a more eﬃcient targeting of resources to
the intended beneﬁciaries (Blackorby and Donaldson (1988)) as fundamental reasons
for their widespread use. Furthermore, when in–kind transfers are used in addition
to optimal income tax schedules, they allow for a welfare enhancement in case of
information asymmetries between governments and citizens, as such transfers fa-
cilitate self–selection (Boadway and Marchand (1995), Blomquist and Christiansen
(1995), Cremer and Gahvari (1997)). It has been shown that a mixed regime of
public and private provision of some quasi–private good, such as health services,
can be preferred by a majority of individuals to an entirely public or entirely private
provision scheme and that, hence, public provision of private goods may constitute
a political equilibrium (Epple and Romano (1996)).
In this paper, I assume that the human attitude towards redistribution is shaped
by essentially two concerns, which have both separately attracted the attention of
economists in recent years: The ﬁrst is altruism, the second is status awareness.
Experimental economic research has generated a considerable amount of evidence
that people do not behave entirely selﬁsh. Altruist behavior has been observed in nu-
merous laboratory experiments.3 Therefore, altruism should play a prominent role
in economic models explaining redistributive behavior: Not astonishingly, wealth
transfers inside families are often assumed to be driven by altruistic motives (Bern-
heim et al. (1985) or Bruce and Waldman (1991)). But even transfers between
strangers may be motivated altruist feelings, as it is the case in Coate (1995).
Nevertheless, it seems as if only few individuals were unconditionally altruist
3Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) give a brief and precise survey on experimental evidence on the
importance of altruism for human behavior.1 INTRODUCTION 4
(cf. Fehr and Schmidt (2006)). People sometimes do behave in an altruist way, and
sometimes they don’t. Such ”pollution” of altruistic feelings is explained in diﬀerent
ways, e.g. as a trade–oﬀ between altruism towards the least well–oﬀ individual
on one hand and a preference for eﬃciency on the other (Engelmann and Strobel
(2004)), or as a trade–oﬀ between altruism and inequality aversion (Fehr et al.
(2006)). Another important form of polluted altruism is the well known warm–glow
argument given by Andreoni (1990). In the present paper I take up this trade–oﬀ
idea. I assume that people trade their altruistic feelings towards poor individuals
against their concerns for social status.
Individual status orientation and relative income concerns are known to have an
eﬀect on economic behavior in general and on attitudes towards redistribution in par-
ticular. They may inﬂuence optimal redistributive taxation (Boskin and Sheshinski
(1978)) or change the optimal policy mix of a tax schedule and education subsidies
(Lommerud (1989)). In a very inﬂuential paper, Corneo and Gr¨ uner (2000) argue
that status considerations may reduce redistribution, as the expected utility of peo-
ple belonging to the middle class rises when the consumption diﬀerential between
themselves and poor people increases.
Falk and Knell (2004) stylize main features that are common to many models
incorporating status: Relative consumption or income are the most widely used
status measures, utility increases in one’s own performance and decreases in the
respective performance of the reference group. Furthermore, the reference standard
is usually exogenously given and assumed to be identical to all individuals. In my
model, status directly enters people’s utility functions (as in Boskin and Sheshinski
(1978), Lommerud (1989), Ng (1987), Akerlof (1997)). It is not a trivial assumption,
that individuals use some income or wealth based measure to evaluate their status,
but yet it is a widespread one and I keep close to the standard.4 Cole et al. (1992)
show that social competition can lead to a situation, where a concern for one’s
relative position in society emerges endogenously, and where higher income implies
higher status. There is also evidence that relative income has a considerable impact
on peoples’ well–being (Luttmer (2005)) or on their economic performance (Torgler
et al. (2006)).
Bruce and Waldman (1991) set up an important benchmark for a non–trivial
explanation of in–kind transfers, by pointing to the fact that once it is assumed that
the donor cares for a particular consumption pattern of the donee, a justiﬁcation
for providing a particular good lays at hand and comes without any surprise. I
4In Ireland (1998) individuals tend to overconsume particular goods in order to signal status,
which is a diﬀerent concept to treat the question.2 THE MODEL 5
think that this argument should be taken seriously. The rich in my model is not
interested in the consumption pattern of the poor. She does not think of the quasi–
private good as a merit good, in which case we would return to the context of
the paternalism argument. Here, the public provision of the quasi–private good is
only a vehicle to avoid a too strong convergence of net incomes. Whether the good
has some virtue other than to allow the reduction of the cash transfer, is of no
particular importance. Nevertheless, the poor’s actual consumption pattern turns
out to become an externality for the utility of the rich – not directly, though, but
only insofar as public provision allows to achieve a precise distribution goal which
is detached from the actual characteristics of the good in question.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the basic setup of the
model and section 3 presents the poor’s decision. Section 4 analyzes the rich’s
policy choices. In section 5 I make some remarks on the result from an ethical point
of view. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
The ambiguous role of in–kind transfers in the presence of status concerns is shown
in a simple framework. The economy consists of just two individuals, one with
some positive exogenous income (”the rich”) and one without any exogenous income
(”the poor”). Furthermore, I assume that there is a government, which executes
the preferred policy of the rich.5 The positive exogenous income of the rich is
denoted y. Both individuals have preferences over two commodities: a (composite)
consumption good c and some quasi–private6 good g which can be provided both
by the government or by private markets. For simpliﬁcation, the price of both
goods is ﬁxed to unity, so that pg = pc = 1. In addition to her preferences for the
commodities, the rich individual is altruistic towards the poor and derives utility
from the poor’s utility, denoted u0.
Hence, she can decide to transfer a share T of her wealth to the poor. She may
make this wealth transfer either in cash, or in kind in terms of good g, or she may
choose some combination of the two. I call gp the in–kind transfer, then T − gp
is the cash transfer. The policy choice of the rich is executed by the government,
which collects T from the rich, and hands it over to the poor: it gives T −gp in cash
5This is clearly a highly simplifying assumption. But in order to keep the model as simple as
possible, the political decision process has been boiled down to the strict minimum. A similar
setting can be found in Coate (1995).
6In the literature on the public provision of private goods, the term quasi–private good usually
designates private goods, that are both provided by the government and by markets.2 THE MODEL 6
and provides gp units of good g to the poor. Then the net cash income of the rich
is y − T and net cash income of the poor is T − gp. The rich uses her net income
to buy cr units of a composite consumption good c or to buy gr units of good g.
The poor can use his net cash income to buy c0 units of the consumption good and
some additional units ga of the quasi–private good g on the market, if the publicly
provided quantity gp is not suﬃcient for him. On the contrary he may not re–sale
any of the publicly provided units.
Additionally, the rich individual cares about the diﬀerence between her own net
cash income and the net cash income of the poor. In the sense of the social decline–
argument described above, she prefers a larger distance between incomes to a smaller
one. Calling this distance D, it is deﬁned by
D = (y − T) − (T − gp) = y − 2T + gp (1)
A rise in the overall wealth transfer T closes the gap between net incomes, a rise
in the in–kind part gp of this transfer widens it, as ∂D/∂T = −2 < 0 and ∂D/
∂gp = 1 > 0. Note that with net income of the poor catching up with net income of
the rich, utility of the latter decreases.






To simplify the following analysis, corner solutions are excluded by the following
Assumption 1 The indiﬀerence surfaces associated to u(cr,gr,u0,D) are tangen-
tial to the coordinate axis.
Preferences of the poor need further explanation: Both individuals are rational
and perfectly aware of their situation, and the poor individual knows that he is poor
and has to rely on the rich’s donations. In this context, altruism towards the rich
would be an awkward assumption. The poor in this model is not altruist, because
he cannot aﬀord any altruism. Neither is it reasonable to assume that he cares
about status, as his exogenous income is zero and depends entirely on transfers. So,
u0 = u0(c0,g0) with u0 strictly quasi–concave and with indiﬀerence curves tangential
to the coordinate axis in the c0–g0–diagram.
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Economic decisions take place in two stages: In a ﬁrst stage, the rich decides on
the overall wealth transfer T and on the split–up of T into an in–kind transfer gp3 THE SECOND STAGE: THE POOR’S CONSUMPTION CHOICE 7
and a cash transfer T − gp. The government then executes this policy choice. In a
second stage, the poor decides whether or not to supplement the publicly provided
quantity gp by private purchases ga. The rich’s optimal policy choice is determined
by backward induction.
3 The second stage: the poor’s consumption choice
On the second stage, the poor individual will have to make his decision contingent
on the policy choice of the rich. As he has no net income of his own he has to cope
with the transfers he receives. Given his disposable cash T − gp and the publicly
provided quantity of g, gp, he will maximize his utility. Hence, he solves the following
maximization problem:
max




a ≥ 0 (4)



















The poor will choose his private purchase ga of good g in order to equalize marginal
utilities derived from the consumption good and from the quasi–private good g re-
spectively. To what extent this is possible is limited by the non-negativity constraint
concerning ga, which is due to the assumption that publicly provided units of g can-
not be resold. Deﬁne g0
opt(T) as the total quantity of the quasi–private good the
individual would consume, if he were not bound by any constraint, given a cash
transfer income of T. Then g0
opt(T) is the poor’s unrestricted Marshallian demand







opt(T) − gp if gp ≤ g0
opt(T)
0 if gp > g0
opt(T)
(6)






−1 if gp ≤ g0
opt(T)
0 if gp > g0
opt(T)
(7)
As it is prohibited to resell gp in part or totally, the poor is always forced to consume













Figure 1: Income allocation of the poor individual
Marshallian demand of the poor, he additionally buys those units privately which
he needs to equalize marginal utilities. When gp exceeds his Marshallian demand,
public provision constrains him. Hence, he overconsumes g and underconsumes c.
Figure 1 illustrates the three possible situations in which the poor can ﬁnd himself:
gp is lower than the poor’s Marshallian demand, gp is equal to it and gp is higher
than g0
opt(T).
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the poor’s indirect utility function.
Once the in–kind share of T, gp, gets higher than the poor’s Marshallian demand



































∂g0 < 0 if gp > g0
opt(T)
(11)4 THE FIRST STAGE: THE RICH’S POLICY CHOICE 9
When the in–kind transfer does not constrain the poor, he will, either by supple-
menting on the market or because the transfer just equals his Marshallian demand
for g, end up in point A. If the in–kind transfer exceeds the poor’s Marshallian
demand, he ﬁnd himself in situation B at a lower utility level.
Remember that it is the rich who ﬁxes T and gp on the ﬁrst stage. The rich
cares positively for the poor’s utility, so constraining the poor and consequently
lowering his utility level will lower her own utility as well. Then the central question
is: Is there any reason, why the poor should ﬁnd himself in the situation with
gp > g0
opt(T), hence being constrained by the in–kind transfer. The answer is yes.
In the following sections, I show that the rich has an incentive to increase gp at a
level which constrains the poor, because the negative eﬀect on the utility of the poor
(and hence on the utility of the rich as well) will be oﬀset by an increase in status
and the resulting positive impact on the rich’s utility.
4 The ﬁrst stage: the rich’s policy choice
4.1 What if status did not matter?
Imagine that the rich individual was altruist towards the poor, but that she did not
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∂gr = 0 (15)
(16)
The rich individual chooses a positive wealth transfer T. The size of T depends pos-
itively on the strength of the rich’s altruistic feelings. To achieve a utility maximum,
the rich has to choose her optimal (T,gp)–bundle so that the poor’s marginal utilities
from consumption and from the quasi–private are equalized. Hence, obviously this
policy choice must not constrain the poor individual. By consequence, given the
7In the following section it is shown that when status concerns matter, only interior solutions
can emerge. Hence, I limit my analysis to interior solutions in the present section as well.4 THE FIRST STAGE: THE RICH’S POLICY CHOICE 10





yields the same maximal
utility for the rich.8 No public provision is needed. On the contrary, the rich has
absolutely no beneﬁt from distorting the poor’s consumption with a constraining
in–kind transfer, as it would make both the poor’s and her own utility fall without
any positive counter eﬀect.













The poor’s marginal rate of substitution (MRS
0
c0,g0) between the consumption good
and the quasi–private good equals the marginal rate of transformation between these
commodities, equaling the price ratio between c and g. His choice is undistorted, he
will always ﬁnd himself in situation A as depicted in ﬁgure 1.
Altruism alone cannot explain the existence of in–kind redistribution. Altruistic
concerns make rich people transfer part of their income to the poor. But once the
optimal wealth transfer is determined, any in–kind transfer which leaves the poor
unconstrained maximizes her utility. This includes the policy of giving no in–kind
transfer at all.
4.2 The inﬂuence of status concerns
Now turn to the utility function as originally deﬁned in (2) where the rich exhibits an
impure altruism vis-` a-vis the poor: Impure in the sense that she wants to raise the
poor’s well being, but not at the price of letting the gap between disposable incomes
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s.t. 0 ≤ T ≤ y (20)
0 ≤ gp ≤ T (21)
g
r ≥ 0 (22)
The assumptions on the utility function directly lead to the following
8In this situation where status does not matter, there is no unique optimal choice for gp. Given
that the rich sets T optimally, any gp from the interval mentioned above yields a utility maximum.4 THE FIRST STAGE: THE RICH’S POLICY CHOICE 11
Lemma 1 At any solution to the maximization problem the side constraints are not
binding.
Proof in the appendix.
Hence, the rich individual will always choose a positive and feasible wealth trans-
fer T, a positive and feasible in–kind share gp and will buy a positive amount gr
for herself. Thus, in the following only interior solutions to the rich’s maximization
problem have to be considered.






































∂gr = 0 (25)
According to equation (25), the rich will always balance marginal utilities derived
from the two commodities, so that
MRScr,gr = 1 (26)
This yields the following:
Proposition 1 Status concerns do not distort the allocation of the rich individual’s
net income and the rich will always choose a non-distorting consumption bundle
cr,gr.
This result is a consequence of the fact that public provision is not universal.
The rich individual is not forced to consume the same quantity gp she wants to be
provided to the poor. Hence, she can freely choose the amount of the quasi–private
good she desires to consume. Given any wealth transfer T that leaves her with some
positive net income, she always allocates her remaining net income eﬃciently.
The deﬁnition of D leads to:
Proposition 2 The rich will never equalize the net cash income of herself and the
poor.
This follows directly from the fact that D = 0, when both cash incomes are equal,
which cannot be a utility maximum given assumption 1. Whereas in the case without4 THE FIRST STAGE: THE RICH’S POLICY CHOICE 12
status, if altruistic feelings are suﬃciently strong, the poor can well end up with a
higher cash income than the rich, here this clearly is not true.
A marginal increase of the wealth transfer T has a negative impact on status,
as it closes the net income gap between the poor and the rich. Thus, it generates
a negative impact on the utility of the rich and the last term of the left hand side
of equation (23) is negative. When choosing the optimal wealth transfer, the rich
faces a trade–oﬀ between her own consumption and the poor’s consumption. The
status concern causes a wedge between marginal utilities derived from her own and
the poor’s consumption, rising the marginal costs (in terms of her own utility) of a
higher consumption of the poor. On the contrary, an increase of the in–kind share
gp of this transfer generates a positive impact on the rich’s utility, as it improves
status and widens the net income gap.
Lemma 2 A situation without public provision cannot be a utility maximum for the
rich.
Given any positive wealth transfer, up to the Marshallian demand of the poorest
for a given T, an increase in gp is a free lunch in terms of status. Because of ∂D/
∂gp = 1 > 0, the rich can ceteris paribus improve her status by giving a larger
share of the wealth transfer in kind. And (10) states that for any gp ≤ g0
opt(T) this
will be utility neutral for the poor. Hence, given any positive and feasible wealth
transfer T, the in–kind share amounts at least to the poor individual’s unconstrained
Marshallian demand for the quasi–private good. This lemma is crucial insofar, as it
states that when status concerns pollute altruistic motives, part of the redistribution
will always be done in kind. Hence, status awareness provides an explanation for
the use of in–kind redistribution.
This result can be extended by
Proposition 3 The chosen in–kind transfer always constrains the poor in his con-
sumption choice.
Proof in the appendix.
The last term of the left hand side of equation (24) is positive, meaning that at
any solution to the maximization problem, the poor derives a higher marginal utility
from good c than from good g. He is constrained. Hence, the poor will always at
least marginally overconsume g at the expense of his consumption of good c, gp will
always exceed the poor’s unconstrained Marshallian demand for the quasi–private
good.4 THE FIRST STAGE: THE RICH’S POLICY CHOICE 13
The rich individual’s status concerns are costly for the poor individual in two
ways: ﬁnancially and in terms of utility. Let us ﬁrst turn to the monetary costs.
















For the next proposition, we need the following
Assumption 2 The rich’s utility function is linearly separable in all arguments and
marginal altruism is positive and constant.
Then equation (27) implicitly yields:
Proposition 4 Under assumption 2, in a situation where the rich individual is
altruistic and cares about status, the global wealth transfer T is lower than in a
conﬁguration without status concern.
Proof in the appendix.
This means that the presence of status concerns reduces the total amount of
redistribution, i.e. the sum of redistribution in cash and in kind. A reduction in
T widens the gap between the rich and the poor and improves the rich individual’s
position. Thus, T will be lowered to a point where the marginal gain induced
by the status argument and the marginal gain induced by a rise in the rich’s own
consumption just outweighs the marginal utility loss, which is caused by the decrease
of the poor’s disposable income.
Furthermore, there are additional costs for the poor in terms of a loss of utility,
which is induced by the distortion of his consumptive choices. The rich’s status
concern creates a negative externality. With the rich choosing her optimal wealth
transfer and the corresponding in–kind share, the marginal positive impact that gp
has on the rich’s status and thus on her utility just outweighs the marginal utility
loss it induces by constraining the poor and by lowering his utility. Reformulation
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where MRS
0
c0,g0 is the poor’s marginal rate of substitution between the composite







> 0 is the status externality
the rich imposes on the poor. At any solution to the rich’s utility maximization,
the poor’s marginal rate of substitution between between the two commodities ex-
ceeds the marginal rate of transformation between c and g, which is equal to unity.
Additionally, equation (30) shows that at an interior utility maximum, the eﬀective
relative price of the poor’s consumption of c exceeds the constant price ratio pc/pg
given by the production technology of g.9 This situation corresponds to point B in
ﬁgure 1.
The higher ∂ur/∂D is, e.g. the stronger the rich’s status concern, the more
important is the distortion which is imposed on the poor. Thus, the degree of
overconsumption of the quasi–private good the poor has to accept depends positively
on how much the rich values the distance between net incomes.
5 The dual costs of status concerns
I have shown that, when the rich cares about status, the poor will dispose of less
purchasing power than he does when the rich disregards status. Furthermore, he
is no longer able to allocate this purchasing power freely the way he wants to. His
consumption choices are distorted, he is forced to underconsume some goods, which
he then values relatively higher at the margin, and to overconsume others, which he
then values relatively lower at the margin.
Hence, the poor pays the price for the rich’s status awareness, and he pays it in
two ways. He directly pays it through the loss of purchasing power – a price which
is easily quantiﬁable. But he also pays it through the loss of consumptive freedom:
the freedom to dispose of his revenues the way he wants to as a rational consumer.
9Note the similarity of this result with Ng (1987), who shows that in the presence of status
eﬀects (measured by a comparison of private consumption), the amount of a public good that
should optimally be provided will exceed optimal provision without status eﬀects, i.e. according
to the Samuelson condition. In his model, agents can use their initial endowment either to buy a
public good, or to buy a private composite good. Status is measured as the relation of one’s own
private good consumption to average private good consumption. In the absence of status eﬀects,
optimal public good provision is determined according to the Samuelson rule. In the presence of
status eﬀects, however, the consumption of the public good has three eﬀects: First, it directly
delivers itself a certain utility, as it does in the case without status. Second, it has a negative
eﬀect on one’s own status at it decreases the relation of individual private consumption to average
private consumption. And third, it creates a positive externality for other individuals by raising
their status position, as average private consumption is decreasing.6 CONCLUSION 15
At a ﬁrst glance, the latter consequence may appear to be rather innocuous, but it
clearly is not.10
The loss of ”freedom of choice” clearly is an issue, which merits a thorough ethical
discussion (see e.g. Sen (1988)). Here I just want to address the consequences of such
a constraint: Why the lack of freedom may have as severe eﬀects as the reduction
of purchasing power, can best be understood by looking at a (possible) extreme
solution to the rich’s utility maximization, where nearly all redistribution is given
in–kind.11 Think of the commodity c as a basket of basic consumption goods such
as food and clothes. With the rich individual opting to redistribute predominantly
in–kind, the poor lacks the ﬁnancial resources necessary to buy even these basic
consumption goods, which are of utmost importance for survival.
The model is simple, and clearly appears oversimpliﬁed to make overhasty pre-
dictions for such real–world situations. But it is far from trivial, as it explains well
the impact a concern for status may have when redistribution is on the agenda.
Whether it is the rich and the middle class in a society who decide in what way
to organize redistribution to the poor, or whether its a rich country who intends to
help a third world country, implications are analogous: The donors always manage
to shift the cost of their status concerns to the donees.
6 Conclusion
The aim of the paper was to give a new explanation for the existence of in–kind
transfers. I have shown that when people are altruist and also care about their
status, in–kind transfers play an ambiguous role: On the one hand, they are used
to transfer wealth and to make the poor better oﬀ. On the other hand the in–kind
share of transfers chosen by the rich always exceeds the poor’s Marshallian demand
for the quasi–private good. Thus the poor is forced to overconsume this good and
to underconsume other consumption goods. Furthermore, status concerns are likely
to decrease the overall volume of resources that is transferred.
10Amartya Sen has repeatedly pointed to the fact that wealth alone is likely to be an incomplete
criterion for the evaluation of the situation an individual is in: ”A person’s well-being is not
really a matter of how rich [sic!] he or she is. [...] Commodity command is a means [sic!] to
the end of well-being, but can scarcely be the end itself” (Sen (1999), p. 19), and in a diﬀerent
essay: ”Despite the crucial role of incomes in the advantages enjoyed by diﬀerent persons, the
relationship between income (and other resources), on the one hand, and individual achievements
and freedoms, on the other, is neither constant nor in any sense automatic and irresistible. Diﬀerent
types of contingencies lead to systematic variations in the ”conversion” of incomes into the distinct
”functionings” we can achieve, and that aﬀects the lifestyle we can enjoy.” (Sen (2000), p. 109)
11This is likely to arise when the rich individual values status very strong relative to altruism.6 CONCLUSION 16
What has to be left out in the present paper is the analysis of a more sophisticated
political equilibrium. But here it is clearly not politics that drive the results. The
analysis can readily be extended to a case with more than two individuals where
the rich and the middle class are forming one group which wants to take care of the
poor and which holds the majority in society. The argument that in–kind transfers
serve to make status friendly redistribution would remain unchanged.
The interpretation of what happens in the present context is not far away from
the point made by Corneo and Gr¨ uner (2000). Richer individuals may have some
interest in the poor staying poor in terms of disposable income. But I want to
underline, that my explanation for the existence of in–kind transfers points into a
diﬀerent direction than existing arguments. Paternalism may or may not be desir-
able. But in the case of paternalist preferences the in–kind transfer is given in the
spirit of enhancing the beneﬁciary’s well–being. In the case of asymmetric informa-
tion, in–kind transfers are a potentially welfare enhancing instrument, which allows
the social planner to loosen self–selection constraints. In–kind transfers avoid ineﬃ-
cient strategic behavior as shown in the literature on the Samaritan’s Dilemma. On
the contrary, in the present situation these transfers are a way to achieve ”cheap”
redistribution: Cheap in the sense that they allow the rich to satisfy their altruist
feelings and to enjoy the warm glow of giving, but without letting the poor come
too close to themselves in terms of net income. I argue that in–kind transfers are
not necessarily given to foster welfare or to guarantee equality of opportunity, but in
order to conserve as far as possible the pre–tax income distribution. In that sense,
in–kind transfers considerably reduce the poor’s elementary freedoms of choice. This
is not to say that arguments defending a positive role of in–kind transfers are not
sensible – in fact I do very much think they are. But there may be much less nice
reasons for which our societies have chosen to give to the poorest in the way they
do than those that have been advanced so far by the economic profession.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
The assumption on indiﬀerence curves not intersecting the axis implies that gr > 0.
Additionally we have to have T < y, as otherwise, together with gr > 0 one would
have cr < 0, which cannot be a utility maximum by the same assumption. Neither
can any solution with gp > T be a utility maximum, as with ˜ ga ≥ 0 this would
imply c0 < 0 which is impossible by the same assumption. With this, the only side
constraints which have to be considered are the non–negativity constraints T ≥ 06 CONCLUSION 17
































































The same assumption as above implies that the two conditions
T − gp − ˜ g
a > 0
gp + ˜ g
a > 0
have to be fulﬁlled. They can be rewritten as follows:
T > gp + ˜ g
a
gp + ˜ g
a > 0
implying T > 0.
But with T > 0 and keeping in mind that ∂ur
∂D
∂D
∂gp > 0 the ﬁrst order condition
on gp implies −∂u0
∂c0 + ∂u0
∂g0 < 0, which is only possible with gp > 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3:
Lemma 1 assures that 0 < T < y. With the assumption of strict quasi–concavity of
the preferences, it is clear that g0
opt(T) < T, i.e. at gp = g0
opt(T) side constraint (21)































as shown in (11). Hence, the rich has an incentive to marginally increase gp. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4:






























Assume that (¯ gp, ¯ T) is the rich individual’s policy choice when caring for status,
leading to ¯ cr, ¯ gr, ¯ c0, ¯ g0 and ¯ D. Then inequality (35) becomes
∂ur(¯ cr,¯ gr,u0(¯ c0, ¯ g0), ¯ D)
∂¯ cr <




Assumption 2 guarantees, that marginal utilities are independent from D. So at
(¯ gp, ¯ T), for a rich individuum not caring for status, we ﬁnd
∂ˆ ur(¯ cr,¯ gr,u0(¯ c0,¯ g0))
∂¯ cr <




However, combining the ﬁrst order conditions (13), (14), and (15) tells us that for







has to be fulﬁlled. Hence, (¯ gp, ¯ T) cannot be the optimal policy choice in a situation
without status. We know (from Proposition 3 together with the fact that when
status concerns are ignored the poor is never constrained by the optimal policy),
that given ¯ T the in–kind share gp will lower in the situation without status concerns
than the in–kind share ¯ gp. Call this (lower) in–kind share ˘ gp, leading to ˘ c0 and ˘ g0.
We can readily infer that
∂u0(¯ c0,¯ g0)
∂¯ g0 <
∂u0(˘ c0, ˘ g0)
∂˘ g0 (39)
while
∂ˆ ur(¯ cr,¯ gr,u0(¯ c0,¯ g0))
∂u0 =
∂ˆ ur(˘ cr, ˘ gr,u0(˘ c0, ˘ g0))
∂u0 (40)
by Assumption 2 so that we, have
∂ˆ ur(¯ cr,¯ gr,u0(˘ c0,˘ g0))
∂¯ cr <
∂ˆ ur(¯ cr,¯ gr,u0(˘ c0,˘ g0))
∂u0
∂u0(˘ c0,˘ g0)
∂˘ g0 (41)6 CONCLUSION 19
This still violates optimality condition (38), hence (˘ gp, ¯ T) cannot be the rich’s policy
choice in a situation without status. Condition (38) can only be fulﬁlled by lowering
the rich’s consumption, and thus by rising the total transfer T, as this increases the
left hand side of inequality (41) (the rich’s marginal utility of consumption) and
decreases the term on the right. Hence status concerns decrease the total wealth
transfer T. ￿REFERENCES 20
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